|by Craig A. Cohen||
Fall 2000, Vol. 63, No. 3
"I never see my child anyway, so why should I pay child support?" There are few things that the court takes more seriously than child support. Next to abuse cases, providing for the basic needs of a minor child is perhaps the most important matter a court can consider in the arena of family law.Statute 23 Pa.C.S.A. §4321(2) states that "[p]arents are liable for the support of their children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger." The obligation imposed under this section is nearly absolute. Com. ex rel. Scanlon v. Scanlon, 311 Pa.Super. 32, 40, 457 A.2d 98, 102 (1983). Moreover, an individual's inability to exercise custody or visitation of the minor child, no matter how unjustified, is completely irrelevant to the duty of that individual to pay child support. See DeWalt v. DeWalt, 365 Pa.Super. 280, 529 A.2d 508 (1987). It is certainly understandable that one paying a significant order of support would necessarily feel a sense of frustration in being denied access to his or her child. I would counsel this individual, however, that it is not the payment of the support that created the entitlement of custody, but rather, the individual's ability as a parent to significantly enhance the quality of the child's life. It would be to the custody arrangement that I would direct my efforts, not necessarily the support. "I'm the mother of the child. Don't I automatically get physical custody?" This notion most likely harkens back to the old theory known as the "tender years doctrine." No longer recognized by the courts, there existed a presumption that during the early or "tender years" of life, a child should be with the mother. Today, however, courts seek an answer to one primary question in determining custody: "What is in the best interests of the child?" Although the issues can be limitless, there are certain factors that a court will consider in making determinations of custody. Among them are the general fitness of the parties to act as good parents; the degree to which a parent seeks to play an active role in the child's life; the existing relationship the child has with a parent; and depending upon age, the preference of the child. While those factors may indeed point to the mother as a preferential prime custodian-due in large part to the societal role women have played in the rearing of children in this country-it is by no means a foregone conclusion that in any particular custody dispute a mother will be given primary custody. "Don't my monthly expenses affect how much child support I pay?" As a general rule, no. And while there are always exceptions to the rule-such as when the parties' combined net income exceeds $15,000 per month, child support shall be calculated pursuant to the standard set forth in Meltzer v. Witsberger, 505 Pa. 462, 480 A.2d 991 (1984) wherein expenses are considered-suffice it to say that unless one is referring to the standard items that are deducted from one's income in child support cases pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2, expenses are pretty much irrelevant. In other words, child support in Pennsylvania is based upon the income of the parties, not the expenses. Unfortunately, it is usually not this type of expense that the prospective client is seeking to have considered in a reduction of child support case. Rather, it is more often in the nature of "that large payment for this really great fishing boat I just got," or the "high monthly payments on my Bloomingdale's credit card," that usually evokes the question in the first place. To that end, the court has very little sympathy. "I have primary custody of my children under a court order. Can't I move anywhere I want?" Having a court order for custody is not a license to move with the children where and when you want. Indeed, having a formal custody order places many restrictions on the parents, custodial and non-custodial alike. In Plowman v. Plowman, 409 Pa.Super. 143, 597 A.2d 701 (1991), the court determined that absent an agreement by the parties, a full evidentiary hearing must be conducted before a child can be moved from the jurisdiction of the court or within a reasonable time thereafter. It is at this hearing that the court will determine, based upon several factors, whether the move can be permitted. The standard for the court to apply in making a determination of relocation was established in the case of Gruber v. Gruber, 400 Pa.Super. 174, 184, 583 A.2d 434, 439 (1990). In Gruber, a three-part test was established to require the court to consider:
The point to be made here is that, invariably, custodial parents make significant, life-altering changes on the misguided presumption that they can simply pick up and move with the children anywhere and at any time they please. One should be cautioned, however, that no matter what sacrifices have been made and no matter what steps have been taken to effectuate a move, the court may find that the best interests of the children are not being preserved, and thus, may not permit the move. "We have been living together for seven years now. Don't we have a common law marriage?" It is noteworthy how many individuals seek to establish or otherwise determine if they have a common law marriage only when they stand to gain or lose something of significant value. I recall a conversation with a prospective client once, where it had been recounted to me that she had been living with a man for several years. He had long been separated from his wife and he and this woman were now living together in a house the woman purchased before the two met. Her concern was that should their relationship fail, could she lose her house to him if he were, in fact, her common law husband.I reassured the woman that she had nothing to worry about. Although Pennsylvania is one of the few states that still recognizes common law marriage, her situation would certainly not qualify. I explained to her that common law marriage is one of agreement of the parties, absent a license or a formal ceremony. To be valid under Pennsylvania law, however, a common law marriage must satisfy two basic requirements. First, the parties to the purported common law marriage must have the capacity to marry. In other words, they must be of legal age to marry and they must be currently unmarried. This, of course, was extremely relevant in this case, since the woman advised me that the man with whom she was living was still married to his wife. For purposes of her scenario, that was the end of the consideration. Second, and the real clincher in these cases, the parties must express a present intent, or verba de praesenti, to be married. There must be some recognition by the parties that they are in fact husband and wife. This, oddly enough, may be enough to form the basis of a marriage under common law principles. Moreover, even if there are no present words of intent, such intent may be inferred from the actions of the parties. For example, has the purported wife taken the husband's name? Do they have a general reputation in the community as being husband and wife? Do the parties wear wedding rings? Do the parties file joint tax returns? If these elements are established, a common law marriage may exist. And while a presumption of common law marriage may be raised by other factors, including constant and regular cohabitation, there is no set rule that requires parties to have lived with each other for seven years. Nevertheless, common law marriage claims are not favored by the courts in Pennsylvania. In the recent case of Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 552 Pa. 253, 714 A.2d 1016 (1998), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "[w]hen an attempt is made to establish a marriage without the usual formalities, the claim must be reviewed with great scrutiny." Id. at 262. Moreover, as stated in Baker v. Mitchell, 143 Pa.Super. 50, 54, 17 A.2d 738, 741 (1940), "the law of Pennsylvania recognizes common law marriages. But they are a fruitful source of perjury and fraud, and, in consequence, they are to be tolerated, not encouraged; the professed contract should be examined with great scrutiny, and it should plainly appear that there was an actual agreement entered into, then and there, to form the legal relation of husband and wife." Id. "Since we have been married only a couple of months, can't I get an annulment instead of a divorce?" Absent other factors, it wouldn't matter if you were married only two minutes. Annulment, to the misunderstanding of many, is not a time-based method of dissolving marriage. Rather, annulment is focused upon the validity of the marriage, on whether, based upon various factors set forth in the statute, the marriage can be deemed void or voidable under the law. Statute 23 Pa.C.S.A. §3304 provides those instances where a marriage may be considered void under the law. The general rule is that where there has been no confirmation by cohabitation following the removal of the following impediments, a marriage shall be deemed void in cases where: (1) either party at the time of marriage had an existing spouse; (2) the parties were related within the degrees of consanguinity prohibited by section 1304(e) of the Divorce Code; (3) either party was incapable of consenting by reason of insanity or serious mental disorder; or (4) either party to a purported common-law marriage was under 18 years of age. In addition, while not void on its face, a marriage may be "voidable." Statute 23 Pa.C.S.A. §3305 provides that the marriage of a person shall be deemed voidable and subject to annulment where: (1) either party was under 16 years of age, unless the marriage was authorized by the court; (2) either party was 16 or 17 years of age and lacked the consent of their parent or guardian and has not subsequently ratified the marriage upon reaching 18 years of age and an action for annulment is commenced within sixty days after the marriage ceremony; (3) either party was under the influence of alcohol or drugs and an action for annulment is commenced within sixty days after the marriage ceremony; (4) either party was at the time of the marriage and still is naturally and incurably impotent, unless the condition was known to the other party prior to the marriage; or (5) one party was induced to enter into the marriage due to fraud, duress, coercion or force. With the exception of sections 3305(a)(2) and 3305(a)(3), the length of time two individuals have been married is irrelevant, and therefore, will not in and of itself establish grounds for an annulment. While there are various personal reasons why individuals seek an annulment-ranging from religious ones to a strong desire to effectuate a legal denial of a past mistake-in many instances, a divorce may provide the same sought-after result. As I stated earlier in this article, this listing represents what I believe to be the most pervasive pieces of public misinformation in the area of family law. By focusing on these basic areas of law, it is my hope to provide practitioners-and clients alike-with an elementary resource to better understand those issues that will invariably arise in the future.